OFILM Denies Profit-Shifting Claims as Related-Party Scrutiny Intensifies

OFILM issued a clarification on August 9 after reports accused its controlling shareholder of moving valuable business to privately controlled affiliates. The company denied manufacturing certain optical communication components for Xinfeiguang or suppressing component prices to transfer profits.

The denial addresses serious allegations, not a routine disagreement over product classification. The disputed claims concern whether OFILM absorbed development costs while businesses linked to controlling shareholder Cai Rongjun captured the resulting commercial value.

OFILM says its operations remain fully independent from Xinfeiguang in both business model and product lines. It also rejects the claim that New Thinking inherited a mature voice coil motor business developed at OFILM's expense.

The clarification narrows the factual dispute, but it does not settle every governance question. Public filings show that OFILM has disclosed related-party dealings involving both companies, including material purchases from New Thinking.

That distinction now defines the story. Operational independence, related-party transactions, product overlap, and profit shifting are separate claims. Each requires different evidence, and OFILM's announcement answers some more directly than others.

OFILM Draws a Firm Boundary Around the Disputed Products

OFILM's central defense is specific: it says the company did not manufacture or subcontract the optical components identified in the critical media coverage.

According to the August 9 clarification notice, the questioned products included optical components for transceiver modules, glass bridges, and precision structural parts. OFILM says it did not produce or process those items for Xinfeiguang.

That denial matters because the original accusation depended on a particular commercial mechanism. Critics reportedly alleged that OFILM supplied components at artificially low prices, allowing Xinfeiguang to retain profits that should have remained inside the listed company.

OFILM rejects both links in that chain. It denies the stated manufacturing relationship and denies deliberately lowering component prices to move earnings outside the public company.

The company also says OFILM and Xinfeiguang operate independently across their business models and product portfolios. That is broader than saying the companies maintain separate legal registrations or accounting records.

Xinfeiguang, formally Xinfeiguang Communication Technology, lists optical imaging modules, optical communication modules, optical devices, and related components within its registered business scope. Cai Rongjun reportedly controls the company.

OFILM remains a listed optical technology manufacturer with operations spanning imaging systems, sensing products, and smart-vehicle components. Its industry position makes any apparent connection to optical communications commercially significant, even when products differ.

The controversy arose because optical technologies can share terminology, materials, or manufacturing processes without serving the same customers. A camera module component and a data-center optical component can both involve precision optics while belonging to distinct supply chains.

That makes product-level evidence essential. Broad descriptions such as "optical component" cannot establish that two businesses sell the same item or that one transferred an opportunity to the other.

However, independence also cannot be established through labels alone. Investors need customer categories, product specifications, production locations, intellectual property ownership, and transaction records to test the boundary.

OFILM's statement provides a categorical response for the products named in the reports. It does not, based on the publicly summarized notice, publish a product-by-product technical comparison.

That leaves an important verification gap. The company's denial is an official disclosure carrying legal consequences, but the detailed supporting records are not available within the newsflash itself.

The second disputed relationship involves New Thinking Motor, a manufacturer associated with voice coil motors. A voice coil motor, or VCM, is a compact electromagnetic actuator commonly used to focus smartphone camera lenses.

The critical coverage reportedly claimed that New Thinking emerged from OFILM's mature VCM operation after OFILM funded its development. OFILM says that account is false.

According to the company, Cai Rongjun and an entity he controls, Shenzhen Hezheng, acquired New Thinking from outside owners. OFILM therefore disputes the suggestion that the business was originally separated from the listed company.

This is more than a debate over corporate history. If New Thinking came from an external acquisition, the alleged transfer of an internally developed OFILM business becomes harder to sustain.

Yet acquisition history does not resolve every subsequent question. It does not automatically establish how later purchases were priced, whether intellectual property was shared, or how procurement decisions were approved.

The clarification changes the immediate burden of proof. Critics must now produce evidence connecting the named products, development costs, or pricing decisions to the alleged transfer.

At the same time, OFILM faces a continuing disclosure challenge. It must make the distinction between shared ownership links and genuinely separate operations understandable to investors.

Related-Party Filings Explain Why the Allegations Gained Attention

The pressure on OFILM comes from a structural conflict: connected companies can transact legitimately, but controlling-shareholder ties demand unusually clear evidence of fair pricing.

OFILM's earlier disclosures identify Xinfeiguang and New Thinking as related parties. That classification does not prove misconduct. It means the relationships require disclosure, governance controls, and market-based terms.

A December 2024 transaction filing estimated OFILM's purchases of materials and services from New Thinking at RMB 550 million for that year. Actual purchases through November were approximately RMB 394 million.

The same filing estimated purchases from Xinfeiguang at RMB 10 million. It also allowed smaller sales of products and services to both related companies.

These figures establish commercial contact, but they do not establish the conduct alleged by critics. Purchases from an affiliate differ from supplying that affiliate with underpriced components.

That direction matters. The media allegation summarized in OFILM's clarification focused on products allegedly moving from OFILM to Xinfeiguang under unfavorable terms.

The disclosed transaction estimates include several categories and directions. Investors should not combine them into a single claim without identifying the products, invoices, and pricing benchmarks involved.

OFILM's 2026 related-party forecast again described dealings with New Thinking and Xinfeiguang. A public filing mirror says transaction prices should follow market pricing and bilateral negotiation.

That policy is conventional, but "market price" can be difficult to assess for customized parts. A specialized motor, optical assembly, or precision component may lack a directly comparable public quotation.

Auditors and independent directors therefore need more than a policy sentence. They need comparable supplier bids, cost structures, margins, contract terms, and evidence that purchasing decisions served the listed company.

New Thinking's disclosed financial profile also raises the stakes. The 2026 filing mirror reported assets of about RMB 1.80 billion and first-half 2025 revenue of roughly RMB 911 million.

It reported first-half net profit of approximately RMB 62.7 million, with those figures described as unaudited. The numbers indicate a substantial operating company, not a minor vendor.

New Thinking's scale does not validate the allegation that OFILM transferred a profitable business. It explains why investors want a precise account of the companies' history and continuing commercial relationship.

The distinction between legal independence and economic dependence also deserves attention. Two companies can maintain separate ownership records, workforces, factories, and product lines while conducting recurring transactions.

Likewise, related parties can trade extensively without shifting profits. The governance question is whether every transaction reflects terms that an independent counterparty would accept.

OFILM's interim report identifies Xinfeiguang and New Thinking among entities relevant to its disclosures. That record makes the affiliations visible to public investors.

Transparency about the relationship is a positive baseline. It also creates a documented trail against which the new clarification can be assessed.

The critical issue is not whether a relationship exists. OFILM's filings already acknowledge related-party status and transactions.

The issue is whether the disputed products fall within those dealings and whether transaction economics favored the private affiliates. The clarification says they did not.

That answer places pressure on two groups. OFILM must substantiate its categorical denial, while the publishers of the allegations must establish their claimed product and pricing connections.

Investors should resist a simpler but misleading choice between believing every allegation and treating disclosure as complete vindication. Related-party governance is usually tested through records, not rhetoric.

The Real Conflict Is Allegation Versus Auditable Evidence

This dispute turns on whether either side can connect its narrative to contracts, engineering records, and comparable prices.

The allegations reportedly present a coherent but unverified story. A controlling shareholder oversees a listed manufacturer and separate private companies operating in adjacent component markets.

Under that theory, the listed company bears costs or accepts weak pricing while the private companies receive higher-margin opportunities. Such arrangements would disadvantage minority shareholders if proven.

OFILM offers the opposite account. It says Xinfeiguang follows an independent business model, does not receive the specified products from OFILM, and has not benefited from deliberately suppressed prices.

For New Thinking, OFILM challenges the accusation at its historical foundation. It says Cai Rongjun and Shenzhen Hezheng acquired the business rather than extracting it from OFILM.

These narratives cannot be reconciled through a general statement that all parties operate in optics or camera components. The product and ownership timelines must be examined separately.

For Xinfeiguang, the strongest evidence would include bills of materials, purchase orders, customer qualification records, and production-site information. Those records could show whether OFILM made the named components.

Invoice data would then address pricing. Investigators could compare any affiliated sales against cost, third-party quotations, and transactions involving unrelated customers.

For New Thinking, corporate registration history and acquisition agreements should establish ownership changes. Patent assignments, employee transfers, and research expense records would address the claimed movement of VCM capabilities.

A mature VCM business requires engineering knowledge, production equipment, customer validation, and intellectual property. A genuine transfer should leave traces across several of those categories.

The absence of a corporate spinout alone would not disprove every form of value transfer. Employees, designs, or customer opportunities can move without an entire subsidiary changing hands.

Conversely, overlapping personnel or adjacent technology would not prove that OFILM funded New Thinking's business. Component industries often draw workers and methods from the same regional manufacturing clusters.

The current public record supports a narrower conclusion. OFILM has formally denied the specific production, pricing, and business-separation accusations summarized in the media report.

The record also shows acknowledged related-party transactions. Those transactions create a legitimate reason for scrutiny, but they are not proof of profit diversion.

This distinction is crucial because clarification announcements can easily be read too broadly. A denial of specified conduct is not an independent audit of every connected transaction.

It is also important to separate gross margin from fairness. A supplier can earn a higher margin than its customer while still charging an arm's-length price.

Different margins can reflect intellectual property, manufacturing yield, volume risk, capital intensity, or bargaining power. They do not automatically reveal which company created the underlying value.

The reverse is also true. A transaction can comply with an internal approval process while still raising questions about whether alternatives were properly tested.

That is why comparable procurement evidence matters. If OFILM solicited independent bids and selected New Thinking on equivalent terms, the allegation would weaken.

If substantial customized purchases lack benchmarks or competitive review, investors would have more reason to demand details. That would still require investigation before supporting a misconduct claim.

The media report's publication around August 6 created immediate reputational pressure. OFILM responded on August 9, limiting the period in which the allegations circulated without a formal answer.

A quick response helps reduce information asymmetry. It does not replace the slower work of verifying technical and financial records.

The timing also places the dispute close to the company's next periodic reporting cycle. Periodic filings offer management, directors, and auditors a structured opportunity to expand the record.

That opportunity is especially important because OFILM has faced recent financial pressure. According to a 2026 earnings preview, the company expected a first-half net loss attributable to shareholders.

Financial strain does not imply related-party abuse. It can make investors more sensitive to any suggestion that profitable opportunities sit outside the listed company.

A loss-making company purchasing substantial components from an affiliate naturally attracts questions about margins and value allocation. Those questions remain questions until supported by transaction-level evidence.

The most useful reporting will therefore avoid treating corporate denial as final proof or treating adjacency as guilt. Both shortcuts obscure the verifiable issues.

Product Independence Does Not End the Governance Test

OFILM can be fully separate from Xinfeiguang operationally and still owe investors a detailed explanation of connected transactions.

Operational independence normally concerns management, personnel, assets, finances, facilities, and commercial decisions. Product independence adds the claim that companies serve distinct markets with separate offerings.

Related-party governance asks another question. It examines whether shared control or influence can affect contracts between legally separate entities.

Those concepts can coexist without contradiction. OFILM and Xinfeiguang can have separate product lines while buying limited materials or services from one another.

The public filings appear consistent with some related dealings. OFILM's clarification is therefore best read as denying the specific production and profit-shifting mechanism, not every commercial connection.

This distinction should guide how investors interpret the phrase "fully independent." The phrase is meaningful, but it needs defined boundaries.

Does it mean there are no shared employees, patents, equipment, customers, or production lines? Does it mean only that the primary products and revenue models differ?

Does independence include autonomous procurement and pricing decisions? The summarized clarification does not publicly answer each question.

A more detailed disclosure could resolve much of the ambiguity without exposing customer secrets. OFILM could identify transaction categories, explain approval controls, and describe how comparable prices are selected.

It could also state whether the disputed components appear anywhere in consolidated production records. That would directly address the most concrete allegation.

For New Thinking, OFILM could provide a concise ownership timeline. It could identify the sellers, acquisition period, and basis for concluding that no OFILM VCM operation was separated.

The company should also distinguish acquiring an external business from later commercial integration. An external origin does not prevent New Thinking from becoming a major OFILM supplier.

That supplier relationship may be commercially sensible. Camera modules require focus actuators, and specialized vendors can achieve better scale than vertically integrated production.

Using an affiliate can also introduce perceived conflicts. The listed company must show that it selected the supplier based on quality, cost, capacity, and delivery performance.

Independent directors carry particular responsibility in this setting. They should evaluate whether transaction limits are reasonable and whether terms match those available from unrelated suppliers.

Shareholder approval rules and disclosure thresholds add procedural safeguards. Procedures remain most persuasive when paired with understandable commercial evidence.

Auditors can test balances, invoices, and transaction completeness. Their work may not independently assess whether OFILM surrendered an unrecorded business opportunity.

That broader question often requires board records, strategy documents, research budgets, and customer communications. It is harder to settle through financial statements alone.

Regulators also distinguish between disclosed related-party transactions and undisclosed tunneling. Tunneling generally describes moving resources from a listed company to controlling owners through unfair arrangements.

The allegation against OFILM resembles that concern, but resemblance is not proof. Establishing it would require showing both a transfer and terms harmful to the listed company.

The company's denial directly contests those elements. It says the named Xinfeiguang products were not made by OFILM and denies intentional underpricing.

For New Thinking, it denies that OFILM paid all development costs before a mature, high-margin VCM business moved outside the company.

These are testable claims. Their specificity is useful because future disclosures or investigations can confirm or challenge them against documents.

Investors should also watch language changes. If later filings narrow the definition of product independence or describe additional transactions, the shift would deserve explanation.

Consistency would strengthen OFILM's account. Detailed, stable descriptions across announcements, periodic reports, and investor communications would reduce uncertainty.

Unexplained differences would weaken it. A company should not describe connected businesses as fully independent in one document while relying on them as extensions of internal operations elsewhere.

The governance test is therefore ongoing. It does not end with the August 9 clarification, and it does not presume the allegations are correct.

Three Signals Will Show Whether the Clarification Holds

The next test is documentary consistency across financial reporting, transaction disclosures, and any regulatory response.

The first signal is OFILM's next periodic report. Investors should examine its related-party note, procurement totals, outstanding balances, and descriptions of goods purchased from New Thinking and Xinfeiguang.

The report should clarify whether transaction volumes remain within approved estimates. It should also explain any significant change in product categories or counterparty dependence.

More granular disclosure would strengthen the company's position. It could show that the disputed Xinfeiguang products do not pass through OFILM's factories or sales accounts.

A vague note repeating only that transactions follow market prices would leave the main verification gap open. It would not contradict the clarification, but it would provide limited new evidence.

The second signal is the next annual related-party transaction forecast. That document should reveal whether OFILM expects purchases or sales involving the two companies to rise, fall, or change composition.

Investors should compare approved limits with actual transactions. Large recurring gaps can reflect conservative budgeting, but they can also reduce the usefulness of transaction caps.

The filing should explain the pricing methodology for customized products. References to market prices carry more weight when comparable suppliers, bidding procedures, or cost-based formulas exist.

New Thinking deserves particular attention because past disclosed purchases were much larger than the amounts involving Xinfeiguang. Supplier concentration can create operational and governance exposure even without wrongdoing.

A lower purchase volume would not automatically validate the criticism. A higher volume would not disprove OFILM's denial, since the dispute concerns business origin and transaction fairness.

The trend matters when combined with product descriptions and margins. Consistent records would reinforce the claim that New Thinking remains an external supplier with independently developed operations.

The third signal is any exchange inquiry, regulatory request, or supplementary company disclosure. Such action would indicate that authorities or the company see a need for more documentation.

A formal inquiry would not mean regulators had found misconduct. It would create a process for asking about ownership history, product overlap, pricing, and approval procedures.

Detailed answers supported by contracts and technical records would strengthen OFILM's clarification. Evasive or internally inconsistent answers would weaken it.

Investors should also monitor whether the original publishers release underlying evidence. The burden remains on accusers to substantiate claims about suppressed prices and transferred development costs.

Screenshots, anonymous assertions, or broad product comparisons would not be enough. Useful evidence would identify transactions, dates, specifications, counterparties, and the basis for claimed price differences.

OFILM's response has already changed the reporting landscape. The allegation can no longer be presented responsibly without including the company's categorical denial.

Likewise, the denial should not be presented as independent verification. The available public information still comes mainly from company filings and summarized media reports.

For suppliers and customers, the dispute introduces a different concern. They need confidence that contracts, intellectual property, and production responsibilities sit with the entity named in their agreements.

For technology-sector investors, the case highlights how adjacent product labels can complicate governance analysis. Optical imaging, optical communications, precision structures, and camera motors share technical language but serve different value chains.

For minority shareholders, the practical question is simpler. They need evidence that the listed company retains the benefits of the research, assets, and customer relationships it funds.

The August 9 clarification provides clear answers on the disputed products and the alleged origin of New Thinking. It does not provide every document needed to independently verify those answers.

That is not unusual for an initial clarification announcement. It makes the next filings more important, because they can convert categorical statements into an auditable record.

Readers following this case should focus on three items: product-level disclosures, related-party transaction economics, and any formal regulatory questions. Those signals will matter more than another round of competing headlines.

OFILM has drawn a firm line between itself and Xinfeiguang. The durability of that line now depends on whether future records consistently support the company's account.